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The article analyses what aspects should be considered 
when deciding on the subjective scope of application of 
lobbying regulation in a country. Any country defining a 
lobbyist should first of all take into account its political and 
legal context, and theoretical insights about the types and 
activities of lobbyists that may exist. Furthermore, good 
practice and lessons from the experience of other coun-
tries should be evaluated. The legal definitions of the terms 
lobbyist and lobbying activities in Lithuania and Poland – the 
first EU member states to start regulating lobbying activ-
ities – are analysed in the article in order to highlight the 
main shortfalls of the existing legislation. The article pro-
vides guidelines on defining a lobbyist for countries plan-
ning to adopt legal regulation of lobbying activities, as well 
as countries wishing to improve existing regulation. 
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In 2015, Transparency International (TI) published a study about lobby-
ing in Europe, where it raised serious concerns about the level of trans-
parency, integrity, and equality of access in lobbying activities in the re-
gion. Research results suggest that attempts by both governments and 
lobbyists to promote open and ethical lobbying standards are ineffective 
because much of the influence remains hidden and informal, there are 
conflicts of interest, and certain groups have privileged access to the deci-
sion makers. Such a situation leads to far-reaching consequences for the 
economy, environment, social cohesion, public safety, and human rights 
(Transparency International, 2015, pp. 6-7). Furthermore, in 2014, the 
European Committee on Legal Cooperation (CDCJ) of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) started preparing a draft recommendation of the Commit-
tee of Ministers to the member states on the legal regulation of lobbying 
activities. This document will provide guidelines on the establishment of 
legal frameworks in national legal systems regarding lobbying, based on 
best practices in different countries, as well take into account the short-
comings faced in those countries which have already enacted national 
rules on lobbying.1
In the European Union, only about half of the member states currently 
have such national rules (European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, 
2016). Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Romania, and Spain are 
considering the adoption of such a law, whereas Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) do not actively see it as necessary and 
rather strongly oppose the initiative of the CoE. However, even states 
with quite long-standing specific laws on lobbying activities face many 
problems regarding the effectiveness of regulations, because much of the 
influencing effort occurs outside of any formal participatory or consulta-
tive channels (Transparency International, 2015, p. 7). As relations be-
tween business and politics grow stronger, larger amounts of money are 
brought to circulate in lobbying activities, creating potential conflicts of 
interest, resulting in undue or hidden influence of business interests, and 
similar problems.
Poland and Lithuania were the first EU countries to adopt laws on lob-
bying activities and have been applying these for more than 10 years. The 
1 For more information, see information from the European Committee on Legal 
Co-operation of the Council of Europe. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/Lob-
bying/Lobbying_en.asp 
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application of these laws clearly displays the advantages and disadvantag-
es of the construction of provisions, as well as helps to identify the main 
issues to be taken into account. The experience and challenges of Poland 
and Lithuania as regards the legal regulation of lobbying activities may be 
useful for countries which will do this in future.
One of the main questions arising in countries which are considering the 
adoption of legal regulation of lobbying activities is how legislation on 
lobbying should be drafted in order to be effective. European countries 
which already have such legislation point out a complex set of reasons 
why legal rules on lobbying activities do not work properly. These include: 
lack of clarity or an overly narrow scope of definitions, enabling the vast 
majority of lobbyists to evade the application of the regulation; inadequa-
cy of definitions of lobbying activities regarding the target of lobbying 
(whether it is solely legislative or includes the executive branch as well); 
lack of motivation to register as a lobbyist because this only brings about 
difficulties and no benefits (an improper application of the carrot and 
stick approach); and many others. This article analyses in detail only one 
aspect of the regulation of lobbying activities, which is usually referred to 
as one of the reasons for the inefficiency of the laws regulating lobbying 
activities; i.e., what groups of actors should be defined as lobbyists in legal 
acts.
The article aims to draw attention to some important issues, which, based 
on the experience of Poland and Lithuania, should be evaluated prior to 
the establishment of a legal definition of a lobbyist. The paper is based on 
the inductive approach: it draws conclusions from the experience of two 
European countries with rather long-standing experience in the regula-
tion of lobbying activities. The main methods used in the paper are the 
following: descriptive analysis, used to present the context of adopting 
the rules on lobbying in Poland and Lithuania, as well the result of reg-
ulation; content analysis, used to explain the definitions used in national 
laws; comparative analysis, used to compare the context, regulation, and 
outcomes of regulation in both countries; and logical induction, used for 
the aggregation of ideas.
The article consists of four main parts. The first part, dedicated to the 
rationale of the definition of a lobbyist, provides a broad view of the ne-
cessity and peculiarities of defining the term lobbyist. The second part dis-
cusses the different approaches towards the actors of lobbying activities 
seen from different perspectives in specific political and cultural contexts. 
The third part deals with the particular cultural and political contexts of 
the adoption of lobbying regulation in Lithuania and Poland. The fourth 
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part presents the practical regulation of lobbying activities in these two 
countries, concentrating on the definition of a lobbyist and its effect, and 
briefly discusses the possible reasons for the regulation functioning in an 
unsatisfactory manner. Finally, the conclusions provide a list of circum-
stances drawn up based on the experience of Poland and Lithuania, which 
countries planning to regulate lobbying activities could take into account.
2.  Rationale of Defining a Lobbyist
First of all, legal regulation of lobbying activities has to stipulate whom 
it will address. It is necessary to determine who is most often engaged in 
exerting, or trying to exert, influence upon politics. This would help define 
to whom the regulation applies and ensure a level playing field for all the 
participants of lobbying activities, making it clear who has certain obliga-
tions and is subject to liability for a breach of rules, as well as, in certain 
cases, decide upon the legality or illegality of lobbying activities. There-
fore, policy makers who are considering regulation of lobbying stress the 
critical importance of defining who is “in” and who is “out” of the regula-
tion (Mihut, 2008, p. 6).
With this in mind, the first step of the country willing to introduce legal 
regulation of lobbying is to decide the subjective scope of the regulation. 
The definition of a lobbyist must be one which best captures the actual 
lobbyists within the state. This implies that every country must carefully 
evaluate the channels of transmission of interests from the civil society, 
including business enterprises, to politics, according to the country’s na-
tional specifics. As will be seen later on, the argument of political culture 
is a decisive one for models of lobbying activities, and, at the same time, 
decisive regarding the legal regulation fitted to a particular situation.
Naturally, the definition of a lobbyist embedded in law should encompass 
the types of actors in the political field who attempt to exert influence 
upon decision makers in a particular country. Polkowska and Czapla note 
that it is important to decide whether legal regulation on lobbying should 
cover only persons who are professional lobbyists, or if it should also apply 
to actors that perform a task assigned to them in the strategic programme 
of lobbying agencies (the media, public affairs and public relations agen-
cies, or legal firms). Moreover, it is necessary to consider whether the reg-
ulation should capture “interest groups whose representatives engage in 
professional lobbying in their activity in the public life spheres that are of 
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interest of those groups, but they do not deploy permanent efforts target-
ed at desired goals (associations, social foundations, civic movements)” 
(Polkowska & Czapla, 2015, p. 3).
The OECD observes that “wording, as always in legislation, determines 
its effectiveness. Experience has shown that vague or partial definitions 
of who is to be covered by legislation, or what activities are encompassed, 
leads to non-compliance or inadequate compliance.” Therefore, the 
OECD proposes the introduction of clear and unambiguous descriptions 
of lobbyists and lobbying activities to ensure that exclusions are precise, 
and to define lobbyists in such a way that the definitions are clearly under-
stood by lobbyists, office holders, and members of the public, and robust 
enough to support legal changes (OECD, 2007, p. 32). TI reiterates the 
idea expressed by the OECD. It claims that “the definition of a lobbyist 
and what constitutes lobbying are crucial to the effectiveness of any lobby 
register, and indeed any form of lobbying regulation”. Their study implies 
that in European countries lobbyists are “often too narrowly defined in 
law, which results in weak registers that fail to capture those seeking to 
influence laws and policies” and adds that “in some cases the result is 
that only a small fraction of lobbyists fall within the net of the register”. 
The study provides an example of the UK Lobbying Act of 2014, which 
was described as “glaringly inadequate” and “deliberately evasive” and de-
clared by the Association of Professional Political Consultants in the UK 
as able to capture only about 1 per cent of those who engage in lobbying 
activities (Transparency International, 2015, p. 31).
3.  Different Approaches Towards Actors of 
Lobbying Activities
It is rather common for a definition of a lobbyist to involve different 
groups of persons who participate in lobbying activities. The research lit-
erature uses different classifications in respect of actors who aim to exert 
influence upon policy makers. However, in practice, lobbyists differ from 
state to state depending on the cultural and legislative background of the 
country.
Analysing types of lobbyists in the United States, Thomas noted that it 
was common to see two types of lobbyists in the US, i.e., independent 
lobbyists and professional lobbyists, both of which were also called “hired 
guns”, as they were paid for their activities. Later on, “hired guns” were 
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contrasted to “amateur” lobbyists; however, the latter definition never 
made it clear whether it was describing lobbying actors who were not 
paid, or actors who were not well-versed in lobbying techniques. In 2003, 
Thomas and Hrebner provided possibly the widest typology of lobbyists, 
including five groups: (1) contract lobbyists (who work under a contract 
to perform lobbying activities, may work for several contractors at the 
same time, and usually work in companies together with other lobbyists); 
(2) in-house lobbyists (presidents, executive directors, and employees of 
companies, organisations, or corporations representing only one subject, 
i.e., their organisation); (3) government legislative liaisons (employers of 
government agencies and local governments representing their agencies 
or local governments to the legislative branch or government, e.g. heads 
and senior staff of (central and local) government agencies, as well elect-
ed and appointed local officials); (4) citizen, cause, or volunteer lobby-
ists (members of small non-profit organisations, social welfare groups, or 
community organisations); and (5) private individuals, “hobbyists”, and 
self-appointed lobbyists (who form a small minority, as in the United 
States they constitute only about 1-2 per cent of all lobbyists. They lobby 
for personal benefits, ideologically acceptable issues, or proposals which 
they find very objectionable) (Thomas, 2004, pp. 152-153).
Many authors compare the European and the US models of lobbying 
contexts and traditions. According to Mihut, European countries and the 
US have different political lobbying environments from a historical point 
of view. Specific elements of political culture in the US and in European 
countries lead to differences in lobbying activities. While US politics is 
polarised around two major parties, European countries usually have mul-
ti-party systems, and the procedure of electing representatives is different 
as well. Very important differences arise from the styles of involvement of 
interest groups and civil society in the election process (e.g. the tradition 
of collecting money from interest groups in the US is rather alien in Eu-
rope). The US system of interest group involvement may be characterised 
by a competitive system of interest groups without privileged associations, 
whereas in European countries it is common that some associations (e.g. 
trade unions, business associations) usually work together with govern-
ments on tripartite arrangements, thus resulting in a number of inter-
est groups with privileged rights (Mihut, 2008, pp. 7-8). Furthermore, 
a number of researchers claim US lobbying is confrontational, aggres-
sive, specialised, and based on financial contributions and legal tactics, 
whereas European lobbying is more consensus-oriented, constructive, 
soft-spoken, and rooted in long-term relations and trust among different 
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stakeholders (Woll, 2012, p. 193, 203). Besides, US lobbyists rely more 
on outside tactics, targeting the media and public issues over individu-
al ones, whereas European lobbyists are more inclined to rely on inside 
lobbying tactics, trying to access policy makers through the provision of 
information and expertise (Hanegraaff, Poletti & Beyers, 2016, pp. 4-5). 
Even the tradition of lobbying is different: professional lobbying as such 
is typical in the US, and rather alien in European countries; there are 
multiple access points to policy makers in European countries, leading to 
the need to reach multiple targets performing lobbying activities; the way 
of raising and using money for electoral campaigns is different, and there 
are also other disparities caused by pluralist and corporatist systems. Thus 
in order to be effective, lobbying regulation should first of all capture all or 
at least the major operators who try to influence public decision making. 
Hanegraaff, Poletti, and Beyers analysed the relationship between lobby-
ing styles in different political cultures and different institutional contexts. 
The research results show that “there is a substantial difference between 
European and American lobbyists concerning the strategies they deploy 
within their country of origin (the predicted outcome for American lobby-
ists is substantially higher compared with European lobbyists)”. However, 
this difference disappears when these lobbyists become active at a similar 
venue. This means that political culture is a highly significant determinant 
of the lobbying style used in a country, but both American and European 
lobbyists are capable of adapting their lobbying strategies to institutional 
circumstances (Hanegraaff, Poletti & Beyers, 2016, p. 21).
However, there is no single model describing lobbying patterns in Eu-
rope. Here, much attention is paid to the variety of interrelations between 
interest groups and the state (or parliaments, in particular). Even what 
is understood by an interest group varies among research papers. Bey-
ers, Eising, and Maloney have analysed research on interest group poli-
tics in Europe and elsewhere (Beyers, Eising & Maloney, 2006) and they 
draw attention to the problem that there are many interrelated definitions 
which sometimes describe the same category: interest groups, political 
interest groups, interest associations, interest organisations, organised in-
terests, pressure groups, specific interests, special interest groups, citizen 
groups, public interest groups, non-governmental organisations, social 
movement organisations, and civil society organisations. They conclude 
that the main characteristics of defining an actor as an interest group 
are organisation, political interest, and informality. Interest groups differ 
from other actors of the political process in that they are “largely focused 
on influencing policy outcomes, trying to force issues onto, or up the po-
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litical agenda, and framing the underlying dimensions that define policy 
issues” (Beyers, Eising & Maloney, 2006, pp. 1106-1107). It is important 
to note from empirical research papers that Campos and Giovannoni, 
as well as Beyers, Eising, and Maloney, point out that both private and 
public companies are involved in national lobbying activities (Campos & 
Giovannoni, 2006, p. 16; Beyers, Eising & Maloney, 2006, p. 1108).
In addition, the practice of relations between interest groups and states 
are different in various European countries. Fink Hafner has analysed the 
politics of interest representation and parliaments in seven post-commu-
nist countries in Eastern Europe, and suggests that these variations are 
determined by the constitutional system, the strength of civil society, and 
the institutionalisation of social partnership, as well as by international or-
ganisations (Fink Hafner, 2011, p. 215). In their empirical research Cam-
pos and Giovannoni noticed that in countries with parliamentary systems 
firms are more likely to join lobby groups (sectoral associations) (Cam-
pos & Giovannoni, 2006, p. 18-19). According to Fink Hafner, European 
countries sense economic pressures from international organisations, e.g. 
the IMF, the World Bank, and others, which push governments towards 
liberalisation reducing state involvement, thereby reducing the space for 
parliamentary opposition to influencing economic policy, and, at the same 
time, EU integration, which “intervened in executive-parliament and in-
terest group-parliamentary communication” and “contributed to both the 
weakening of national legislatures and (...) interest group involvement in 
legislative decision-making” (Fink Hafner, 2011, p. 216). She also points 
out that a strong system of social partnership may lead to the weakening 
of parliament and vice versa, depending on whether final socio-economic 
decisions are passed as laws in parliament or result from agreements with-
in social partnership institutions (Fink Hafner, 2011, p. 216). Similarly, 
differentiation has been noticed among the “old” EU states. Having an-
alysed forms of lobbying in different states, Liebert provides a classifica-
tion of lobbying regimes: the model of liberal pluralism (the Netherlands 
and Italy), post-liberal pluralism (Scandinavian countries and Germany), 
statist anti-pluralism (Spain, Greece, France, and Denmark), and person-
alised clientelism (Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal) (Liebert, 1995, 
pp. 438-439). The new member states also have their peculiarities in the 
interest group – parliament relations. As McGrath points out, “new” EU 
member states share some general trends: civil servants have close work-
ing relations with major interest organisations (e.g. over 95 per cent in 
Lithuania, 80 per cent in Poland) and interest groups are often consulted 
informally; interest groups place a relatively high emphasis on building 
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relationships with party leaders, clientelism is flourishing, and the practice 
of “fixers” or “contacts” is commonly used, i.e., when a person who knows 
public officials and is willing to influence them is called on (McGrath, 
2008, p. 16-17). Besides, as Campos and Giovannoni note, in transitional 
countries the percentage of foreign investment in a firm increases the use 
of transparent lobbying activities and reduces the likelihood of informal 
and corruption-related contacts between companies and politics (Cam-
pos & Giovannoni, 2006, p. 21). This implies that national firms in tran-
sitional states are more inclined towards informal contacts with politics.
In Europe, especially in post-communist countries, the notion of profes-
sional lobbyists is a quite new one, although the practice of lobbying has 
a long-standing tradition. An example of research into Slovenian circum-
stances perfectly illustrates the situation: research shows that in 2013 only 
about 3 per cent of politicians had lobbying contacts with professional 
lobbyists, and in 2014 nearly 4 per cent did so. Lobbying activities are 
more frequently carried out through interest groups which place a rel-
atively high emphasis on building relationships with politics (McGrath, 
2008, p. 17). According to McGrath, a particular consequence of the 
emergence of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe was that busi-
ness associations, which were not permitted under communism, began 
to be established, developing business associations which exert influence 
upon the state (McGrath, 2008, p. 18).
The analysis of understanding of what a lobbyist is in the US as opposed 
to European countries discloses different patterns of understanding lob-
bying actors: whereas the US emphasises the distinction between profes-
sional and unprofessional lobbyism, European countries concentrate on 
interest group activities, whether formally or informally seeking to exert 
influence on politics.
4.  Cultural and Political Context of Lobbying 
Regulation in Lithuania and Poland
Both in Lithuania and Poland people used to have a very negative attitude 
towards lobbying. According to various research findings, lobbying was 
perceived as a phenomenon consisting of networks of informal relations, 
through which private interests, on the basis of “reciprocity of mutual 
services”, penetrate contacts between business groups and political elites 
(Galkowski, 2008, p. 3).
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The initiatives to draft laws on lobbying in Poland and Lithuania followed 
different paths. In Poland, society is permanently discontent with the sit-
uation in the decision-making procedure, whose irregularities could be 
tracked by certain research. As Galkowski points out, research commis-
sioned by the National Chamber of Commerce of Poland in 1998 re-
vealed that local councillors believed that one out of three politicians “ac-
commodated” the interests of a particular firm and conducted “business 
prospecting” on its behalf, as part of his or her official public activity. The 
same study showed that members of parliament believed the number to 
be almost one out of four politicians. In a report on corruption in 1999, 
the World Bank described the “pathological” forms of lobbying in the 
Lower House of Polish Parliament as including the practice of providing 
financial benefits in return for the “favours” of blocking or modifying the 
provisions to be included in laws (Galkowski, 2008, p. 3).
One of the accelerators of the introduction of legal regulation on lobbying 
was possibly the largest political scandal in Polish political history. This 
was the result of a bribery attempt by famous film producer Lew Rywin, 
who in 2002, on behalf of an anonymous group of politicians, tried to 
convince the executives of the Agora Group Company to pay $17 million 
to have favourable legal regulation on the media market adopted (Ma-
kowski, 2009, p. 3). The “Rywin Affair” disclosed irregular practices in the 
decision-making procedure, which eventually led to the proposal of the 
law on lobbying.
The Law on Lobbying Activities in the Legislative Process was adopted 
in 2005 as a result of a heated debate about the low standards of Polish 
democracy and political institutions (Jasiecki, 2006, p. 1). Actually, there 
were three regulatory proposals on the lobbying model in Poland. The first 
proposal placed an emphasis on the regulation of conduct of high-ranking 
state officials, the second proposal promoted legal regulation of lobby-
ing activities, and the third called upon the self-regulation of lobbyists 
(Polkowska & Czapla, 2015, p. 4). However, it was finally decided to con-
centrate on the legal regulation of lobbying activities. The discussions on 
the draft law raised serious concerns among business associations. Their 
statutory objectives usually include lobbying on behalf of their members, 
while members’ contributions serve as a fee for such activities. Thus the 
business community exerted pressure during the preparatory activities, 
seeking that the draft specify expressis verbis that the chambers of com-
merce and industry cannot be affected by the law on lobbying. Moreover, 
the business associations wanted this exclusion to apply to all non-govern-
mental associations as well. The basis for such claims was the following: if 
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lobbying activities cannot be conducted by political parties, other organi-
sations, including business associations, should also be excluded by anal-
ogy (Galkowski, 2008, p. 4). The draft law prepared in 2003 contained ex-
ceptions relating to persons who carry out lobbying activities. However, as 
a result of several convictions to a number of deputies who were members 
of the Extraordinary Committee, and a strong ideological fight between 
opposing parties, the draft law was changed and all exceptions relating to 
the operators of the lobbying activity were removed.
As regards timing, the first draft of the Law on Lobbying Activities in 
the Legislative Procedure was drawn up in about a year, and presented 
to the Sejm in October 2003. During the deliberations on the draft law, a 
sanction-oriented approach to the proposed legislation shifted to a good 
governance approach aimed at increasing transparency and accountabili-
ty (OECD, 2009, p. 141). Thus the main goal of the adopted law turned 
to be the promotion of good governance by enhancing the transparency 
of the legislative process (Olejnik, 2014, p. 118). The law was passed on 7 
July 2005 and came into force in March 2006.
The need for lobbying regulation was caused by the change of the polit-
ical and economic system after the collapse of communism, when new 
players such as business organisations, private companies, the media, 
NGOs, international organisations, and others joined the public sphere. 
The appearance of new players in the light of the old communist prac-
tices, rooted in governmental structures, introduced serious problems: 
first of all, relating to corruption issues. This called for a review of the 
regulatory system and the introduction of new rules for better regulation 
(Jasiecki, 2006, pp. 2-4). However, although legal regulation of lobbying 
was caused by political corruption scandals, it looks as if the final draft 
of the law, which had the biggest impact on the scope of application and 
the real effect of the law, was subject to political pressure and reflected a 
settlement of accounts between political parties (Galkowski, 2008, p. 5; 
Jasiecki, 2006, pp. 8-12).
In Lithuania, contrary to the Polish situation, the first attempts to regu-
late lobbying activities came along with the negotiations for EU member-
ship, rather than being induced by political scandals. Therefore, the intro-
duction of the idea to regulate lobbying was not intrinsic: first there was 
external demand, and only later was it discussed what regulation model to 
adapt. Although the OECD study states that the regulation and the defi-
nitions used should “reflect the broad constitutional and political realities 
of the country for which they are devised. Therefore, they cannot be trans-
ferred from one political system to another without careful consideration 
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and modification” (OECD, 2007, p. 32), this issue was not duly taken 
into account while drafting the Lithuanian law. According to Ragauskas, 
it is one thing to frame real processes occurring in society, and a com-
pletely different thing to create new processes. This could also be said 
about lobbying regulation in Lithuania, as the drafters of the law searched 
for “an ideal model” of lobbying in the experience of countries which al-
ready had both lobbying traditions and regulations. Thus the drafting of 
the law on lobbying activities in Lithuania concentrated on the analysis of 
different foreign legal models, and the US model was selected for further 
analysis because it had the longest tradition (Ragauskas, 2011, p. 81). In 
parliamentary debates former member of the Parliament of Lithuania, A. 
Grumadas, accurately pointed out that while the lobbyists of Capitol Hill 
would probably “envy the working conditions of those actually influencing 
decision-making in Lithuania”, the new law aims to “prepare cosmonaut 
suits and then see if there would be cosmonauts willing to try them on” 
(TI Lithuanian Chapter, 2015, p. 6).
The fact that the actual situation of lobbying practices in Lithuania was 
not duly assessed before the adoption of the law is evidenced by the aston-
ishingly short period between the submission of the law to the Parliament 
and its adoption: the draft project was submitted on 27 April 2000 and 
the law was passed after only 2 months – on 27 June 2000.
The examples of drafting the laws on the legal regulation of lobbying in 
Poland and Lithuania suggest that the drafting of laws did not include a 
thorough evaluation of the cultural and legal contexts of the two states 
nor the actual practices used to exert influence during the law-making 
procedure and/or executive work.
5.  Definition of a Lobbyist and its Effect in 
Practice
5.1.  Definition of a Lobbyist in Lithuanian and Polish Laws
According to the Law on Lobbying of the Republic of Lithuania, the term 
lobbyist refers to a natural or legal person, for or without compensation, at-
tempting to exert influence to have, in the interests of the client of lobby-
ing activities, legal acts modified or repealed, or new legal acts adopted or 
rejected. However, the Lithuanian law includes a long list of persons who 
are not entitled to be lobbyists. These include the following: persons un-
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der the age of 18; state politicians, state officials, civil servants, or judges; 
former state politicians, state officials, civil servants, or judges (if less than 
one year has elapsed from the expiry of their powers or term of office, 
or from their dismissal, until the filing of an application to be included 
in the register of lobbyists); and persons convicted of a deliberate crime, 
provided that the conviction has not expired or has not been annulled. A 
legal person is also not entitled to be a lobbyist if the employee of the legal 
person who will be or is carrying out lobbying activities meets at least one 
of the conditions applicable to a natural person, or if the legal person is 
a state or municipal institution. Moreover, it is very important to stress 
that the Lithuanian law provides exceptions, listing activities which are 
not considered lobbying. These include: activities or work of owners, pub-
lishers, or employees of the mass media related to information about legal 
acts and their drafts: publication of the whole text or a part of it, review, 
and comments. This provision does not apply when owners, publishers, or 
employees of the mass media means receive remuneration for lobbying 
activities; activities of persons who at the invitation of state and municipal 
institutions or establishments participate as experts or specialists for or 
without compensation in the preparation, consideration, or explanation 
of draft legal acts; activities carried out by state politicians, state officials, 
or civil servants with the aim of initiating, preparing, considering, adopt-
ing, and explaining draft laws and other legal acts, when such activities are 
carried out in accordance with their official powers granted to them by le-
gal acts; activities of non-profit organisations aimed at exerting influence 
in the common interests of their members to have legal acts modified 
or repealed, or new legal acts adopted or rejected; activities of scientists 
(pedagogues), except in cases when they act in the interests of a client of 
lobbying activities; and an opinion expressed by a natural person regard-
ing the modification or repeal of legal acts, or the adoption or rejection 
of new legal acts, except in cases when that natural person acts in the 
interests of a client of lobbying activities.
As may be seen from this, Lithuanian legislation sharply restricts the defi-
nition of a lobbyist, and includes only “contract lobbyists” or “professional 
lobbyists”, although European research literature and the data on lob-
bying contacts from Slovenia supports the idea that European countries 
should first concentrate on the activities of non-professional lobbyists. 
Moreover, the exceptions of persons who are not entitled to be lobbyists 
and exceptions of activities not considered lobbying support the idea that 
such was the intention of the legislator. Exceptions clearly state that the 
activities of persons acting on their own, as well the activities of experts, 
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scientists, and non-profit organisations shall not be regarded as lobbying 
activities. In fact, the last category comprises the most influential lobby-
ists in Lithuania (Ragauskas, 2011, pp. 87-88). Non-profit organisations 
usually seek to exert influence in the interest of their members. These are 
various associations, unions, religious organisations, and similar subjects. 
The removal of this group from the definition of a lobbyist was made 
deliberately, as may be seen from the public discourse in Lithuanian me-
dia.2 Thus “in-house” lobbyists, acting on behalf of either corporations or 
organisations in Lithuania, are not captured by the lobbying regulation. 
Government legislative liaisons are removed from the list of lobbyists as 
well, as activities of state politicians, state officials, or civil servants are not 
regarded as lobbying activities. However, this provision should not apply 
to the municipal level, at least not in theory. However, in practice, there 
is a recent case where a mayor of a town, at the same time president of 
the Association of Local Authorities of Lithuania, tried to exert pressure 
upon the Minister of Environment and the Prime Minister in order to 
accelerate the adoption of a government resolution governing issues rel-
evant to particular members of the municipality (Organised Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project, 2016). However, the investigators only 
mentioned “undue influence” rather than illegal lobbying activities.
Finally, the law does not recognise either citizen, cause, or volunteer lob-
byists, or private individuals, “hobbyists”, and self-appointed lobbyists, 
because it provides an exception not only for non-profit organisations, but 
also for an opinion expressed by a natural person regarding the modifica-
tion or repeal of legal acts, or the adoption or rejection of new legal acts.
The exceptions provided for in Lithuanian law regarding experts, scien-
tists, and advisors is also an increasingly important issue, at least at the 
regional level, because a few years ago the participation of experts in EU 
institutions came to be at stake. For example, the Alter-EU organisation 
noticed corporate dominance at the expense of civil society in a number 
of powerful expert groups at the EU level. They documented that as of 
2013, in the Data Retention Experts Group, all seven non-governmental 
members represented the interests of telecommunications corporations. 
Acknowledging this problem, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, 
opened an investigation on the formation and activities of the European 
Commission’s (EC’s) expert groups (Transparency International, 2015, 
2 E.g. the article “Industrialists shake off being called lobbyists” on one of the most 
popular news portals in Lithuania („Pramonininkai kratosi lobistu˛ vardo“. Delfi.lt, 21-09-
2004. http://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/pramonininkai-kratosi-lobistu-vardo.d?id=5152737. 
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p. 55). Furthermore, some organisations expressed their concern about 
the activities of the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) to the President of the 
EC. In their opinion, the creation of the CSA position undermined the 
entire structure of EU legislation by introducing the possibility of reintro-
ducing personal opinion in an official manner at the very end of the pro-
cess, i.e., when scientific assessments have reached the top of the EC for 
decision-making. According to Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), 
a combination of weakness (one person with a small office) and power 
(privileged access to the most senior decision makers of the EC) makes 
it a perfect channel to bypass whatever scientific assessment the rest of 
the EU system produces (CEO, 2014). Later on, at the end of 2015, the 
EC initiated the creation of the High Level Group (HLG) of scientific 
advisors within a “Scientific Advice Mechanism”, which is intended to 
replace the position of the CSA. It is still doubtful whether the advisors 
will do their job appropriately, as, according to the CEO, advisors “must 
resist politicians’ demands to provide scientific justifications of the policy 
options they’re pushing, resist the temptation to influence the political 
agenda themselves, and accept that politicians sometimes ignore their ad-
vice because science is only one of the many dimensions politicians must 
take into account when making a decision” (CEO, 2015). Although a very 
robust procedure is laid down for the appointment of the group mem-
bers,3 the appointment of the first group was still followed by discontent 
on part of certain organisations regarding the objectivity of submitting the 
candidatures (CEO, 2015). Therefore, the appointment of experts and 
their capacity to provide impartial and unprejudiced information must 
be strictly observed. In this case, the sole ground for declaring a person 
an expert rather than a lobbyist, and removing all the duties relating to 
lobbying activities, is the invitation “of state and municipal institutions or 
establishments”. This is surely a big gap which enables a legal exertion of 
influence in the legislation process.
As TI has noticed about Lithuania, “most de facto lobbyists in the coun-
try, including companies acting in their own interests, business associ-
ations, trade unions, religious organisations, various public institutions, 
and non-profits do not have to officially register, meaning that the vast 
majority of lobbying activities remain off the record” (Transparency In-
ternational, 2015, p. 31). Besides, the Chief Official Ethics Commission, 
the designated oversight body of the register, has repeatedly called on the 
3 Commission Decision of 16 October 2015 on the setting up of the High Level 
Group of Scientific Advisors. 
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Seimas since 2005 to address the law, noting that it is leading to the overall 
failure of the regulation (Chief Official Ethics Commission, 2010).
It is worth mentioning that in 2014 a new draft Law of the Republic of 
Lithuania on Lobbying Activities was prepared. However, the definitions 
of lobbying and lobbying activities were not effectively broadened. A lob-
byist is described as a natural person or a participant of a legal person, 
member of a management board or employer, who pursues lobbying ac-
tivities under the assignment and in the interests of the client. The defini-
tion of a “client of lobbying activities” reveals that the assignment may be 
given not just in the form of a contract, but also in the form of a command 
by a legal person to their employer, member of the board, or participant. 
However, as the assignment of the lobbying task is still to be objectively 
existent, the definitions leave outside the scope of application cases where 
the owner or another decision maker within the organisation is pursuing 
lobbying activities himself or herself, which is usually the case in Lithua-
nia. Moreover, the definition of the term lobbying activities is much more 
narrow: according to the draft, lobbying activities should mean only activ-
ities which “exert influence” rather than “attempt to exert influence”, as is 
provided for in the currently applicable law, although as a general rule, the 
core of the definition of “lobbying activities” is “an effort to affect what 
the government does” (Nownes, 2006, p. 5; Hunter, Wilson & Brunk, 
1991, pp. 488-503). It may be predicted that in case the formulation of 
the draft law on lobbyists and lobbying activities is not changed, the new 
law will be of no effect, as is the case with its predecessor.
To sum up, although both the law in force and the draft law on lobbying 
activities in Lithuania provide only a single definition of a lobbyist, they 
capture only a small number of the persons who might act seeking to in-
fluence politicians either in the legislative or the executive branch.
In Poland, according to the Law on the Lobbying Activity in the Legis-
lative Process, the lobbyist is a person who pursues lobbying activities. 
Although the original draft of the Polish law, which was submitted by the 
government to the Sejm in 2003, specified which groups and organisa-
tions were not subject to its provisions, expressly listing representatives of 
diplomatic missions, political parties, trade unions, as well as associations 
of employers, the law in force does not contain any exceptions (Cocirta, 
2006/2007, p. 8). However, the Polish law makes a difference between 
“lobbying activities” and “professional lobbying activities”, levying higher 
duties on persons who participate in professional lobbying activities as 
regards transparency, registration, and integrity rules.
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“Lobbying activity” is “any activity conducted by legally allowed means, 
which leads towards the exertion of influence upon the organs of public 
authorities in the law-making process” (Makowski, 2009, p. 4). Lobby-
ing activity is generally aimed at influencing the public authorities in the 
law-making process, and professional lobbying activity is a specific form 
of lobbying activity, carried out for payment, for the benefit of third par-
ties. “Professional lobbying activity” is “gainful lobbying activity conduct-
ed on behalf of third parties in order to arrive at the interests of such third 
parties being taken into account in the law-making process” (Makowski, 
2009, p. 4). This activity may be carried out either by an entrepreneur, 
or by a natural person under a civil contract with a client (Polkowska 
& Czapla, 2015, p. 5). However, professional lobbying activity may be 
pursued only if the person is included in the register of lobbyists. A per-
son working for his or her own interest does not have such an obligation 
(Jasiecki, 2006, pp. 7-8).
Whereas the Lithuanian law receives much criticism due to the exceptions 
of lobbying activities allowing the most active lobbyist to evade the appli-
cation of the law, the Polish law, on the contrary, is much criticised due to 
its vagueness of definitions, and it is stated that failure to properly define 
lobbyists and lobbying activities leads to non-compliance or inadequate 
compliance (Cocirta, 2006/2007, p. 8). As Makowski states, one the one 
hand, the general definition of lobbying in Poland is too broad; on the 
other hand, the definition of professional lobbying is too narrow. So, both 
are imprecise (Makowski, 2009, p. 7). First of all, criticism of the defini-
tion of lobbying activities is directed at the fact that every person is enti-
tled by the constitution to participate in the process of law-making (e.g. 
the right to receive information or a right to petition) and these rights are 
scrutinised in other laws. Therefore, it is at this point that lobbying legisla-
tion enters the area regulated by other laws, unreasonably restricting their 
use. Furthermore, press or research articles, public statements, and other 
actions relating to the legislative procedure must be regarded as lobbying 
activities, because these are intentional actions which at any time may 
lead “towards the exertion of influence upon the organs of public authori-
ties” (Makowski, 2009, pp. 7-8). Another group of practical problems lies 
within the definition of professional lobbying activities. First, it is unclear 
whether the persons working under contracts in NGOs should fall under 
the category of professional lobbyist. The same problem arises with law-
yers, barristers, and legal advisers, who literally would also fall under the 
notion of professional lobbyists, as part of their activities is participation 
in the legislative process. In addition, it is unclear whether representatives 
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of trade unions should register as professional lobbyists, although, as in 
the Lithuanian case, relations between the parliament, the government, 
and trade unions have different patterns than regular lobbying activities 
and are subject to special procedures, such as a tripartite council, and 
others. Finally, the definition of professional lobbyists in Polish law is 
criticised as being limited to the activities based on commercial activities 
or under civil contracts. This means, that regular “in-house” lobbyists, who 
are employees of the organisation, fall outside the scope of the definition 
of professional lobbyists (Makowski, 2009, pp. 8-9).
A comparison of the legal notions of a lobbyist in Lithuania and Poland 
shows that these countries, although they use different methods to con-
struct the definitions (e.g. in Lithuania “lobbying activities” mean only 
what is meant by “professional lobbying activities” under Polish law), 
have similar problems in covering the persons who are actually involved 
in lobbying activities. Lithuania is mostly criticised for having too many 
exceptions, which allows the “real” lobbyists to bypass the application of 
the law, whereas Poland (besides the defectively described relation of lob-
byists with the clients of lobbying activities failing to include employment 
relations) is blamed for an overly vague definition, whereby, without the 
provision of exceptions, it is unclear whether the law should be applicable 
in respect of all the participants in the law-making procedure. 
5.2.  Effect of the Law: Situation of Official Lobbying 
Although Lithuania and Poland have had laws on lobbying for over a dec-
ade,4 both available statistics and research in a broader context imply the 
weakness of legal regulation of lobbying, resulting in its inefficiency.
Researchers analysing lobbying in Lithuania claim that the official sta-
tistics display a very low level of lobbying, and that the rules of liability 
for a breach of lobbying-related requirements are not properly enforced; 
therefore, there are no preconditions to speak about the actual effect of 
the legal regulation of lobbying activities (Ragauskas, 2011, p. 78).
In 2016 the register of lobbyists in Lithuania contained 36 registered lob-
byists; however, in 2014 only 8 lobbyists were officially active, and par-
ticipated in the drafting of 43 laws. Taking into account that in 2014 the 
4 In Poland, the Law on the Lobbying Activities in the Legislative Process, adopted in 
2005, in force from 2006 (Journal of Law, 2005, No 169-1414); in Lithuania, Law on Lob-
bying Activities, adopted in 2000, in force from 2001 (Official Gazette, 2000, No 56-1644). 
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Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas) adopted 621 laws, this amounts to less 
than 7 per cent of total laws. 100 per cent of the declared objects of lobby-
ing were laws; no official lobbying was registered in respect of acts of the 
government, the ministries, or other state institutions. Ru˜ta Mrazauskaite˙, 
representative of the TI Lithuanian Chapter, states that in Lithuania “pol-
itics seem to be made at the backstage. We know that there are many 
interest groups affecting legislation, but we only see the lead actors on the 
stage” (TI Lithuanian Chapter, 2015, p. 4). Having in mind the fact that 
various associations representing business (both those acting in a broad 
interest field, such as the Lithuanian Business Employers Confederation 
or the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists, and those in particular 
fields, like the Association of Lithuanian Banks or the Lithuanian Small 
Brewers Association) are permanent guests of the parliament and the gov-
ernment, and bearing in mind that some of them even have their names 
on the offices in the government building, it is clear, that the forms of 
exerting influence not officially declared as lobbying activities under the 
existing law are incomparable to official lobbying activities, either in re-
spect of volume or their real effect (Ragauskas, 2011, p. 95).
Although the purpose of the law of the Republic of Lithuania on lobbying 
activities is to regulate lobbying activities, their control and liability to 
violations, as well as to ensure publicity and transparency and to prevent 
illegal lobbying activities, the rules on liability have not in fact been en-
forced, corruption in the legislation procedure has not been precluded, 
nor has the transparent drafting of laws been activated.
Researchers explain the ineffectiveness of the law on lobbying activities 
by a number of reasons. These include the overly narrow personal scope 
of lobbyists, the non-existence of differentiated legal regulation to sep-
arate groups of lobbyists, failure to preclude illegal lobbying activities, 
ineffective legal liability for the breach of lobbying regulation, and failure 
to provide positive stimulus for the acquisition of lobbyist status (Ambra-
saite˙, 2015, p. 5).
Very similar things may be said about Poland. Although the number of 
registered professional lobbyists is increasing every year, the officially de-
clared activity of lobbyists is very vague. Olejnik, who has examined offi-
cial lobbying activities in Poland for the period 2006-2010, stresses that 
the number of entities performing professional lobbying activities during 
this period was very small. The number of participants registered and ex-
ercising has been increasing; however, their activities such as submitting 
notifications of interests to draft legal acts, and taking positions and ap-
pealing in particular matters or proposing legal amendments, have been 
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very few (Olejnik, 2014, pp. 131-133). In Poland, in 2015 the register of 
professional lobbyists contained 310 entries; however, in 2014 only 35 
lobbyists were involved in professional lobbying on parliamentary prem-
ises, and 22 lobbyists declared having taken actions aimed at the Sejm 
(the lower house of the Parliament). In total, only 9 professional lobbyists 
participated in 31 meetings of the Sejm committees (among these in 21 
health committee meetings). During the same year, professional lobbying 
activity in the Senate (the higher house of the Parliament) was limited 
to 4 bills, where lobbyists participated in 5 Senate committee meetings 
(Polkowska & Czapla, 2015, pp. 9-10).
As in Lithuania, researchers blame this situation on the defective con-
struction of the Polish law on lobbying. First, it is said that the Law on 
Lobbying Activities in the Legislative Process only fragmentarily creates 
an illusion of control, does not cover all fields of the legislative process 
(does not include legislation of the president and at the local level) (Ma-
kowski, 2009, p. 14). Secondly, the subjective and objective scope of the 
law is very narrow, as many lobbying activities performed by different 
actors are not captured by the law. It is interesting to note that, whereas 
the Lithuanian law on lobbying activities is criticised due to its failure to 
embed different regulation regimes based on the professionalism of a lob-
byist, the Polish law is attacked because it differentiates between lobbyists 
and professional lobbyists. It is said that the legislative process leads to 
an uneven status of lobbyists, different access to the decision makers, as 
well as different obligations to join the register and supervision of their 
activity. Furthermore, as there is a difference between the two groups, it 
is repressive for professional lobbyists but not repressive for other lobby-
ists, who are formally non-professional, such as business associations and 
NGOs (Jasiecki, 2006, p. 8).
Although there is a complex set of reasons for the improper effect of the 
law on lobbying activities both in Poland and in Lithuania, in both cases 
one of the main problems is a deficient definition of a lobbyist.
6.  Conclusion
Differences in lobbying models imply the need to take into account some 
aspects calling for a differentiated, country-specific definition of a lobby-
ist. It would not be a mistake to state that each country has to evaluate 
country-specific issues; first of all, regarding the context of lobbying reg-
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ulations. However, the analysis of the context of adoption of lobbying 
regulation, the formulations of a lobbyist in the law, and the outcome of 
the regulation in Poland and Lithuania – the first two EU member states 
to adopt lobbying regulation – all provide some implications on specific 
issues for countries planning to regulate lobbying in future.
First of all, a country seeking to regulate lobbying activities should de-
fine the targeted field of policy making: whether it is only the legislative 
branch, or both the legislative and executive branches. Nowadays, many 
government policies are formulated or at least shaped at administrative 
levels; therefore, an increasing number of countries tend to employ a 
broader definition of where lobbying is carried out (Pross, 2007, p. 5). It 
is highly plausible that the latter case involves more contact points and 
more operators acting in a different manner.
Secondly, the definition of a lobbyist should be constructed in such a way 
that it captures the actual relations of influence exertion in respect of 
policy makers, and the legislator must be cautious in making exceptions 
so as not to have any ambiguities remain. Referring to the experience of 
Poland and Lithuania, lobbying organisations are extremely active in the 
procedure of defining a lobbyist. Therefore, in order to be successful, the 
adoption of a law regulating lobbying needs to overcome considerable 
resistance from factual lobbyists. 
A number of researchers claim that it is very difficult to properly define 
a lobbyist in European countries, due to the uneven status of interest 
groups in the policy-making procedure. In most, the participation of 
business associations and trade unions has historically been quasi-insti-
tutionalised within the public decision-making processes (Transparency 
International, 2015, p. 15). However, in the process of globalisation, as 
the OECD states, “the intrusion of multinational corporations and inter-
national social movements has challenged corporatist policy-making sys-
tems, and encouraged authorities in those systems to consider adopting 
North American-style lobby regulation. Such a project, however, must 
deal with the challenge of adapting regulatory frameworks that assume 
no prior privileged position for any group, to one that has for decades 
incorporated certain groups into policy deliberations” (OECD, 2007, p. 
29). Thus countries with inclinations towards corporatist structures have 
to consider which path to choose – to equalise the participation rights of 
all operators, or to stay connected to the corporatist model and to adjust 
accordingly the provisions on lobbying activities, including the definition 
of a lobbyist. However, what is important for most European countries is 
that they have different parliamentary lobby regimes, depending on var-
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ious contextual circumstances. Thus a formal reception of best practices 
used in other countries, even EU member states, may lead to failure of 
regulation. Therefore, the national specifics of interest group interactions 
with parliaments (as well as the government) must be assessed in every 
particular case.
Both Lithuania and Poland have unsuccessfully tackled professional lob-
byism, thus omitting factual lobbying relations between major interest 
groups (especially business associations). Professional lobbyism, deter-
mined by the tradition of lobbying, is inherent to the US model. Thus 
countries such as Lithuania and Poland, as well as a number of other 
European countries, when concentrating on the regulation of profession-
al lobbying, may – considering it has no roots in the political tradition of 
European countries – omit factual influence-exerting relations performed 
by other operators who never register or engage in “professional” or paid 
lobbying activities.
Going into detail, it must be taken into account that the application of 
lobbying regulation is a burden both for the government and at the indi-
vidual level. Although it is possible, at least theoretically, to capture under 
regulation all the persons who may seek to exert influence on politicians, 
each particular country should decide on the balance of persons to be reg-
ulated, having in mind that a number of operators may only accidentally 
seek to contact politicians, or do this very rarely as part of their profession. 
One such example in Poland and Lithuania is the consideration whether 
lawyers and advocates should be regarded as lobbyists, as a (usually rath-
er small) part of their practice involves sometimes contacting politicians 
with certain suggestions on law-making. For instance, in Poland, accord-
ing to the law, advocates and legal advisers are obliged to engage in the 
process of improving the legal system, which naturally involves participa-
tion in the legislative procedure (Makowski, 2009, p. 9). Similarly, in Lith-
uania, advocates satisfy all the requirements for a lobbyist who is subject 
to registration under the Lithuanian law on lobbying activities. However, 
in Lithuania this issue is solved by stating in the Law on the Bar of the 
Republic of Lithuania that advocates may provide services of a lobbyist in 
the manner prescribed by the law. This means that advocates wishing to 
provide services which fall under the regulation of lobbying activities must 
register as lobbyists, and only then provide lobbying-related services. In 
practice, this provision is implemented, as the register of lobbyists contain 
several entries of advocates.
In connection with what has been said before, it is important to consider 
that the levying of an additional administrative and transparency burden 
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on lobbyists may be the reason why persons try to evade the requirement 
to register as a lobbyist, or to fall outside the scope of lobbying regula-
tion. This again calls for a very clear definition of lobbyists and suggests 
that in order for the regulation of lobbying activities to be effective, it is 
indispensable to confer on lobbyists not only duties but also rights, which 
are not granted by the general rules for public participation in public de-
cision-making.
Moreover, the dangers of including persons with the potential to exert 
influence on decision makers (e.g. “experts”, “advisers”, etc.) in the scope 
of application of lobbying regulation must be duly considered.
Finally, it must be remembered that lobbying activities are only one form 
of the wider concept of public participation in public decision-making. 
Other laws regulate rights such as the right to meet with members of 
parliament, right to petition, right to receive and submit information to 
public authorities, and others. The drafting of regulation of lobbying ac-
tivities should include an adequate  evaluation of the existing le-
gal framework on the right to participate in public decision making in a 
particular country and the elimination of possible duplications and gaps, 
which as a rule lead to legal uncertainty and problems regarding the prop-
er implementation of the regulation.
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HOW TO DEFINE A LOBBYIST: EXPERIENCE OF POLAND AND 
LITHUANIA
Summary
The article analyses what aspects should be considered when deciding on the 
subjective scope of application of lobbying regulation in a country. Any country 
defining a lobbyist should first of all take into account its political and legal 
context and theoretical insights about the types and activities of lobbyists that 
may exist. Furthermore, good practice and lessons from the experience of other 
countries should be evaluated. The legal definitions of the terms lobbyist and 
lobbying activities in Lithuania and Poland – the first EU member states to start 
regulating lobbying activities – are analysed in the article in order to highlight 
the main shortfalls of the existing legislation. The article provides guidelines on 
defining a lobbyist for countries planning to adopt legal regulation of lobbying 
activities, as well as countries wishing to improve existing regulation. It must 
be remembered that lobbying activities are only one form of the wider concept 
of public participation in public decision making. Other laws regulate rights 
such as the right to meet with members of parliament, right to petition, right to 
receive and submit information to public authorities, and others. The drafting of 
regulation of lobbying activities should include an adequate evaluation of the 
existing legal framework on the right to participate in public decision making 
in a particular country and the elimination of possible duplications and gaps, 
which as a rule lead to legal uncertainty and problems regarding the proper 
implementation of the regulation.
Keywords: lobbyist, lobbying activities, regulation, legal definition
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KAKO DEFINIRATI LOBISTA: ISKUSTVO POLJSKE I LITVE 
Sažetak
U radu se analiziraju aspekti koje je potrebno uzeti u obzir prilikom određi-
vanja subjektivnog dosega primjene zakonske regulacije lobiranja u pojedinoj 
državi. Prilikom definiranja pojma lobista svaka država mora uzeti u obzir vla-
stiti politički sustav i zakonodavni kontekst, kao i teorijske spoznaje o mogućim 
vrstama lobista i aktivnostima kojima se oni bave. Također, potebno je sagledati 
dobru praksu i iskustva drugih zemalja. U radu se analiziraju zakonske defi-
nicije pojmova lobista i aktivnosti lobiranja u Litvi i Poljskoj – prvim državama 
članicama EU-a koje su uvele zakonsku regulaciju aktivnosti lobiranja – kako 
bi se naglasili glavni nedostatci postojećeg zakonodavstva. Također, ističu se 
smjernice o tome kako definirati pojam lobista u onim državama koje namjera-
vaju zakonski regulirati aktivnosti lobiranja, kao i u onim državama koje žele 
unaprijediti postojeće zakone. Potebno je imati na umu kako aktivnosti lobi-
ranja čine samo dio šireg pojma sudjelovanja javnosti u javnome odlučivanju. 
Postoji niz drugih zakona kojim se reguliraju razna prava, npr. pravo na sa-
stanak s članovima parlamenta, pravo na podnošenje peticije, pravo na pristup 
informacijama i podnošenje informacija javnim vlastima te druga prava. Nacrt 
zakona o aktivnostima lobiranja trebao bi sadržavati procjenu postojećeg za-
konskog okvira kojim je uređeno pravo na sudjelovanje u javnome odlučivanju 
te bi trebao ukloniti sva moguća preklapanja i praznine koje u pravilu imaju 
kao posljedicu zakonsku nesigurnost i poteškoće kod pravilne implementacije 
zakonskih odredbi.
Ključne riječi: lobist, aktivnosti lobiranja, regulacija, zakonska definicija
